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ABSTRACT: Prior to 1640 England’s fiscal base was limited and attempts to expand it promp-
ted serious legal problems. In the period of the civil war and revolution (1640-1660) new
sources of revenue were established which, despite evidence of resistance, permanently
transformed the fiscal base. A third phase, 1660-1690 then followed in which these revenues
were stabilised, and in the final phase, rapidly expanded, providing the security for a trans-
formation of public borrowing. This transformation depended not on force but on the esta-
blishment of forms of revenue-raising that enjoyed widespread legitimacy. The paper briefly
sets out the problem of explaining this phenomenon, before considering the ways in which
historians have approached the issue of compliance. Overall, I argue for the need to marry
macro- and micro-historical forms of analysis.
The historiography of state formation has been dominated by accounts of the effects of
the escalating costs of warfare, and by macro-sociological approaches such as those of
Ertman and Tilly.1 What I want to suggest here is that the investigation of the effects of
warfare on the development of the state would be enriched by a greater concern with
political ideas, micro-sociology and with the techniques of cultural history. Firstly, I will
place English experience in the context of the kind of large-scale changes that are the fo-
cus for the work of Tilly and Ertman. But I will then look in more detail at the issue of
compliance, and suggest that to understand the phenomena with which these historians
are concerned we need to consider more carefully issues of legitimation. Raising this
question, while it is an issue about which Weber had much to say, of course, takes us
away from much of the macro-sociology inspired by Weber. Instead it raises issues for
which a different kind of sociology –micro-sociology– is more helpful. I will give two
concrete illustrations of this: the importance of the language of parliamentary legitimacy
and the definition of social roles which could be played by state officials with some pros-
pect of securing consent.
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1. Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states, A.D.990-1990 (Oxford, 1990); Thomas Ertman,
Birth of Leviathan: building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe (Cambridge, 1997). I have
discussed the detail of much of what follows in other publications, and offer here a summary of my work on
these questions.
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IFirstly though, the macro-sociological perspective on the English case. A number of his-
torians have become sceptical about the usefulness of the term «military revolution» in
a European context, but no-one would deny the importance of war to early modern Eu-
ropean society.2 The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw almost continuous war
among Europe’s great powers: by one account there were 34 such wars in the sixteenth
century, each averaging 1.6 years in duration, so that there was a war somewhere in Eu-
rope 95% of the time. The following century saw little improvement –there 29 wars,
each lasting 1.7 years, so that one or more of the great powers was at war 94% of the
time.3 As early as 1583 the English privy council was concerned that «all forrain princes,
beinge neigbours to this Realme be in armes, and that the manner of the present warres
do differ from warres in former tymes».4 The extent of ‘revolution’ may be debated, but
not the political and administrative costs of this bellicosity, for not just was the frequency
of war increasing, so too was the cost and complexity of the armies and weaponry with
which it was fought. Historians are familiar with these administrative costs –the steadily
increasing size and cost of armies –as well as the human costs– casualties of war and the
presence of these armies. What is given less attention is the problem of legitimation con-
fronted by those seeking to make war. Administrative action requires, on the whole, con-
sent. Early modern governments were taking more and more extravagant political ac-
tions in the light of escalating military commitments and costs, and this posed difficulties
of persuasion.
The key period in the English case was the mid-seventeenth century which saw
dramatic changes in the scale and composition of public finances.5 It was in the civil
war that the modern armies were raised and equipped in England, and the financial
measures taken to support this new burden were of lasting significance. A crude in-
dication of the magnitude and chronology of these changes is the size of national
budgets and armed forces. Firstly, then, the matter of scale of public revenues. It se-
ems that the proportion of national wealth commanded by national government dou-
bled, in real terms, during the 1640s and did so again in the 1690s.6 In the 1590s Eli-
zabeth’s total income was about £500,000 per annum. In the 1690s it was ten times as
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2. For an excellent critical overview see Jeremy Black, A military revolution?: military change and Euro-
pean society 1550-1800 (Basingstoke, 1991).
3. Findings quoted in Tilly, Capital, p. 72.
4. Henry E. Huntington Library in San Marino, California [hereafter HEH], EL 6253 fo. 1r.
5. For a fuller account see Michael J. Braddick, «The rise of the fiscal state», in Barry Coward (ed.), A
Companion to Stuart Britain (Blackwell, 2002), pp. 69-87.
6. P. K. O’Brien and P. A. Hunt, «The rise of a fiscal state in England, 1485-1815», Historical Research,
66 (1993), 129-76. The earlier figure is approximate and the shifting balance between local rates and national
taxation means that it is difficult to read off the total cost of government from figures relating only to national
taxation. Nonetheless, the total cost of government did, undoubtedly, increase very significantly in this period.
This material is discussed in Michael J. Braddick, The nerves of state: taxation and the financing of the English
state, 1558-1714 (Manchester, 1996), pp. 6-12.
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great.7 This was an increase well above the rate of inflation and of population growth
–there can be little doubt that the real burden of taxation per capita increased conside-
rably in this period.
Secondly, the scale of military mobilization. During the civil wars perhaps one in ten
adult males were in arms.8 Between 1647 (after the end of the first civil war) and 1660
the size of the armed forces in England fluctuated between 11,000 and 47,000. Army of-
ficers were active in local government and garrisons exercised a significant economic,
political and religious effect on their localities.9 This was not a military dictatorship but
it was a large proportion of the population to support from national taxation.10 Army si-
zes increased again during the 1680s, reaching nearly 20,000 by the middle of the deca-
de and 34,000 on the eve of the Glorious Revolution.11 The navy also grew rapidly. The
peace time complement during the 1660s was 3,000 to 4,000, reaching 20,000 during the
second Dutch War.12 Famously, of course, English military commitments increased mas-
sively after 1690, resulting in armed forces of well over 100,000 men: this was probably
greater than the combined population of England’s seven biggest cities (aside from Lon-
don) in 1700.13 This placed a huge extra burden on agrarian surpluses and represents a
miraculous transformation from the military capacity available a century earlier. Much
recent work emphasizes the importance of changes during the 1690s but I have argued
that there were two significance stages in this development: the 1640s and the 1690s
seem to me to have been of at least equal significance.14
This was not just a matter of scale, however, but of the way in which the state was
funded. There was a long-term shift in the composition of the revenues too. Before the
civil wars parliamentary taxation provided about 25% of total revenues, and was pro-
bably of declining significance. After 1660 the proportion was reversed, and by the
1690s parliament was providing about 90% of total revenues. In the main, these came
from assessments, the excise and the customs.15 Two of these were innovations of the
first civil war, in the early 1640s. In seventeenth-century England there was a dramatic
change in the tax-raising capacity of the national government, prompted by the need for
military spending and dateable fairly precisely to the period 1641-1643.
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7. Braddick, Nerves, table 2.1; C. G. A. Clay, Economic expansion and social change: England 1500-1700,
2 vols. (Cambridge, 1984), II, pp. 261, 268.
8. John Morrill, «Introduction», in Morrill (ed.), The impact of the English civil war (London, 1991), pp.
8-16, at p. 9.
9. Henry M. Reece, «The military presence in England, 1649-60», DPhil thesis, Oxford University
(1981), chs. 6-7, appendix I.
10. For the arguments against describing the regimes of the 1650s as a «military dictatorship», see Aus-
tin Woolrych, «The Cromwellian protectorate: a military dictatorship?», History, 75 (1990), 207-231. Reece ta-
kes a gloomier view of the role of the army: «Military presence».
11. John Childs, The army, James II and the glorious revolution (Manchester, 1980), pp. 1-3.
12. Michael J. Braddick, «An English military revolution?», Historical Journal, 36 (1993), 965-975, at p. 973.
13. For this calculation see Braddick, Nerves, p. 190.
14. Ibid. For an account emphasising the importance of the 1690s see John Brewer, The sinews of power:
war, money and the English state, 1688-1783 (London, 1989).
15. Braddick, Nerves, pp. 12-16.
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For historians of early modern England this presents something of a problem of expla-
nation –the unreasonable acquiescence and compliance of the English taxpayer. In much
writing about the early modern English state it is assumed that there was an automatic ten-
sion between the interests of the centre and of the locality.16 This tension might have been
assumed to have been manifest in the administration of taxation, and taxation was certainly
an important issue in provincial rebellions elsewhere in Europe.17 There was, certainly, con-
flict between national government and some local interests over taxation before 1640, but
it is much less difficult to discern after that point. And yet, the opposite should have been
the case, since the burden of national taxation may have increased by 15 or 19-fold in some
places.18 My research in the national archives revealed only two fatalities, and few examples
of violent resistance.19 Two is a significant number if you are one of the two, or a member of
their family, of course, but not particularly impressive beside the record of French taxpa-
yers. The extent of resistance, violent or otherwise, certainly did not rise in proportion with
the increase in tax yields, and that must make us wonder about a model of central-local re-
lations which posits an automatic and necessary conflict of interests.
Was the absence of resistance due to the fact of state military power? During the civil
wars, of course, tax raising was backed by the force of arms. A significant military presen-
ce threatened dire consequences to tax resisters. Even if there was no threat of taxes being
taken by force the alternative to payment may have seemed to be free-quarter.20 But this
military explanation does not work well for the period after 1660 when the domestic mili-
tary presence was much reduced. In the long-run, then, direct physical force seems an un-
convincing explanation for the acquiescence of the English taxpayer. It may not work for
the 1640s either. Examples of violent resistance to taxation are rare but where they occur
it is often the case that soldiers were present.21 A military role in tax collection may have
exacerbated, rather than reduced tensions. Much recent work on the local impact of the
fighting has emphasised the lawfulness of the parliamentary troops, and the extent to
which their victory was built on good relations with local populations. Another way to
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16. As Hutton wrote in 1981: «it is becoming obvious that there were two Civil Wars, the formal strug-
gle between the rival partisans and the struggle between those partisans and the bulk of the population, who-
se support they attempted to enlist for their war effort»: Ronald Hutton, «The royalist war effort», in Morrill
(ed.), Reactions, 51-66, quotation at p. 51. See also Robert Ashton, «From Roundhead to Cavalier tyranny,
1642-9», ibid., 185-207. The clearest statement of the importance of neutralism and localism is John Morrill,
Revolt in the provinces: the people of England and the tragedies of war 1630-1648, 2nd edn., (London, 1999),
which includes a reflection on criticisms of this approach made since the 1980s.
17. Perez Zagorin, Rebels and rulers, 1500-1660 (Cambridge, 1982), passim, and for France esp. I, pp.
126-7. It is a central theme of many classic accounts of early modern rebellion: for example, Roland Mousnier,
Peasant uprisings in seventeenth century France, Russia and China (New York, 1960) and Yves-Marie Bercé, Re-
volt and revolution in early modern Europe: An essay on the history political violence, translated by Joseph Ber-
gin (Manchester, 1987).
18. Michael J. Braddick, Parliamentary taxation in seventeenth-century England: local administration and
response, Royal Historical Society Studies in History, 70 (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 274-275.
19. Ibid., p. 276.
20. Ibid, pp. 278-279.
21. Ibid., pp. 276-278.
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make the same point is through the activities of Clubmen –local groups which formed to
protect their localities from both armies, in other words, a neutral, local force. Clubmen
seem to have been active in areas of weak, rather than strong military control, where the
two armies contested local control. Where a garrison presence was securely established lo-
cal hostilities seem to have been reduced. Perhaps all this should not surprise us –heavy
tax payments are only one side of the coin. The tax money was spent on supplies and so
there were plenty of people who made a profit from the armies.22 In any case, over the
long-run and probably in the 1640s too, tax-collection was not achieved by military force.
II
One important part of any explanation is to consider the way in which the scope for
avoidance and evasion was reduced. For a moment let’s assume that no-one willingly
paid taxation. If no-one wanted to pay taxes, but they were not forced out the popula-
tion at sword-point, how would we explain the unprecedented success of the later Stuart
governments? One way of thinking about this is to look at the ways in which the possi-
bilities of evading taxation were reduced –the first resort of the reluctant taxpayer is
probably not riot, revolt or revolution, but evasion.
A number of administrative changes were made which reduced the possibilities of
concealing wealth from tax collectors. Taxation was raised on objects that were difficult
to conceal.23 Most obviously, taxes fell on land, which is difficult to hide. But this crea-
ted an unfairness, in that land was by no means the only form of wealth or income in
early modern England, and to rely only on taxes on land was to unfairly burden particu-
lar sections of the population. As a result efforts were made to locate other forms of we-
alth suitable for taxation that were equally difficult to hide. Inland excises sought to tax
a very wide range of domestic items of consumption, on the argument that levels of con-
sumption reflect levels of wealth. Thus, it was thought improper to tax necessities such
as bread –a staple item of consumption among the poor– but perfectly appropriate to
tax consumption of decencies –such as beer– and of luxury items. But such consumption
is difficult to trace without entering every house in the country and recording its con-
tents, or of every retail outlet. Similarly items consumed in inns, taverns or coffee hou-
ses remained largely invisible to government. In the 1640s attempts to tax consumption
of meat, a semi-luxury item, involved sending tax collectors to markets to raise a pay-
ment on every animal sold. This was inflammatory and difficult to achieve and the exci-
se on meat was abandoned in 1647. Instead, the excises came to centre mainly on the
consumption of beer. The tax was raised at the point of production –the brewery– rat-
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22. Michael Braddick, God’s fury, England’s fire: a new history of the English civil wars (London, 2008),
pp. 413-421 (clubmen); ch. 14 (costs and beneficiaries of war).
23. There is surprisingly little work on tax policy in this sense: William Kennedy, English taxation, 1640-
1799: an essay on policy and opinion (Cambridge, Mass., 1913) and Maurice Ashley, Financial and commercial
policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, revised edn. (Oxford, 1962) remain important.
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her than at the point of sale or consumption, since this involved surveillance of far fewer
sites.24 The other staple source of income was the customs. Policing evasion in the cus-
toms involved seeking to force ships to land in ports with adequate facilities for survei-
llance, and during office hours.25
In all three cases –that is, of the taxes on land, beer and customs– there was, actually,
really a negotiation between the formal liability of taxpayers and a level of payment ac-
ceptable to the taxing authorities –what we call composition. For example, to regularly
oversee levels of production in a brewery was expensive and time consuming. It was bet-
ter to do a deal with the brewer that he would pay tax on a certain level of production,
accepting that it was probably less than his full legal liability. On the brewers’ part, such
a composition, although it involved paying quite high levels of taxation, was preferable
to paying the full legal liability and enduring the practical irritations of regular oversight
of production.26 Similarly, the cargoes of ships setting into English ports were not sub-
ject to a complete search –it is unlikely that every crate and bale was weighed and ope-
ned. Instead samples were tested and estimates entered of the total quantities being lan-
ded.27 Thirdly, the land taxes were raised on a notional basis of a proportion of the
market value of the land. In practice, the local arrangements for taxation which com-
missioners employed meant that most land was not taxed at this rate, and there were cer-
tainly wide variations in the effective rate of taxation between different parts of the
country.28 Stricter forms of administration, then, were often part of a bargaining strategy,
rather than the actual basis for tax-raising.29
Taxing forms of wealth that were difficult to hide was an important part of the ad-
ministrative response to the difficulty of raising taxation. A second dimension of the
process of administrative reform was to develop forms of collection which made it less
likely that there would be collusion between tax collectors and those seeking to avoid
paying. In general there were two strategies here. On one hand, professional revenue
agents were increasingly used to assess wealth for indirect taxation. Such agents were in-
sulated from local interests and their career prospects depended on accurate enforce-
ment of the formal rules of assessment. There was a high political cost in this, of course,
and such people were often extremely unpopular.30 For direct taxes another strategy was
preferred, in which influential local people were instructed to raised a particular amount
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24. Braddick, Parliamentary taxation, esp. pp. 192-223.
25. The customs are also surprisingly little studied from this perspective. For summary and further refe-
rence see Braddick, Nerves, ch. 3.
26. Braddick, Parliamentary taxation, esp. pp. 192-223.
27. Braddick, Nerves, pp. 56-64.
28. For the complex range of quotas applied and the obscure relationship between them see Braddick,
Parliamentary taxation, pp. 141-145.
29. Michael J. Braddick, «State formation and political culture in Elizabethan and Stuart England: mi-
cro-histories and macro-historical change», in Ronald Asch and Dagmar Freist (Hg.), Staatsbildung als kulte-
reller prozess: Strukturwandel und Legitimation von Herrschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit (Köln, 2005), 69-90, pp.
82-84.
30. Michael J Braddick, State formation in early modern England, c.1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000), chs. 1, 6.
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of money by, effectively, whatever means and criteria were found locally acceptable. In
this way local sensibilities were respected, but the overall yield of the tax was protected
because a fixed amount had been demanded.31 This latter strategy was common to many
European states. The first, the bureaucratic solution, seems to have been more distincti-
vely English.32 To return to the main point, however, the issue of increasing tax yields is
in part an administrative question –how did governments succeed in putting people in a
position where they had a choice of paying or of breaking the law? A range of forms of
wealth were fixed upon which were difficult to conceal, and they were assessed by me-
ans which reduced the possibilities of collusion between tax payers and the agencies
charged with their collection.
In this context we are considering the law simply as a coercive instrument, although
much recent work could be used to illustrate the inadequacy of such a view. But here we
are considering the case of reluctant taxpayers who have been put in a position where
they have to do something –pay taxes– because to do otherwise is to break the law. At
this point the second of the two transformations of the 1640s becomes particularly sig-
nificant, because it removed the legal ambiguity which had attended the collection of
some early Stuart «taxes». Under the pressure of inflation early Stuart governments
sought to redefine a number of legal rights which were acknowledged to exist. For
example, the right to raise supplies directly for consumption of the royal household was
transformed into a payment, so that it looked quite like a tax. Similarly, provision of mi-
litary resources for defence was the responsibility of the militia. Although in origin, this
reflected the obligation of every subject to offer military service to the King, in the six-
teenth century this was transformed for most people into a payment to support the acti-
vities of a more specialised military organisation –the trained bands. People who did not
want to meet this payments, whatever their motivation, could claim that their reluctan-
ce was born out of respect for the constitution and even, as we will see, out of respect for
the monarch. After 1640 virtually all taxation was parliamentary in origin and this line
of argument was foreclosed. Put another way, those reluctant to pay, after 1640, could
not claim with any plausibility to be acting in the interest of the public by preserving the
rule of law. Parliamentary sanction was important to the success of tax-raising. Before
1640 parliamentary taxation had been evaded, or grants made reluctantly. There was no
legal challenge to its propriety. Non-parliamentary taxation, on the other hand, promp-
ted a number of highly visible legal challenges –whether a tax was parliamentary or not
was clearly an important variable in determining the response to it. After 1640 almost all
public revenue was parliamentary, and it was much less easily evaded. The result was in-
creased yields.33
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32. Brewer, Sinews, esp. pp. 101-114, 250-251.
33. For a summary and overview see Braddick, «Rise of the fiscal state».
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III
Here, the issue of compliance becomes one of cultural and intellectual history –of the in-
vocation and manipulation of political languages– and of the significance of parliamen-
tary sanction to the legitimacy of a tax demand. For the sake of argument I will stick
with the minimal proposition –that no-one was sincere in their professed motives for rai-
sing, or resisting taxes. The raising of taxation, or resistance to it, will be presumed to be
purely a matter of narrowly-construed, immediate and material self-interest. This is in
line with a number of recent accounts of early Stuart history, although I am not certain
that it is really a safe assumption. But as Glenn Burgess puts it: «We have become fami-
liar with the image of a world in which political conflict in central government … is seen
as the product of faction, and in which opposition to new forms of taxation is thought to
reflect not principled rejection of the tax but an attempt to avoid paying it»·.34 Such an
assumption does not mean that political ideals are irrelevant to understanding political
life, however. For example, an influential school of historians working on eighteenth-
century politics sought to establish that political life was not driven by matters of prin-
ciple, but of material or family interest. According to Skinner, however, these people, the
Namierites
have in effect been involved in a non sequitur. It does not, as they have tended to suppose, fo-
llow from the fact that an agent’s professed principles may be ex post facto rationalizations
that they have no role to play in explaining his behaviour. [T]his argument ignores the impli-
cations of the fact that any agent possesses a standard motive for attempting to legitimate his
untoward social or political actions. This implies first of all that he will be committed to clai-
ming that his apparently untoward actions were in fact motivated by some accepted set of so-
cial or political principles. And this in turn implies that, even if the agent is not in fact moti-
vated by any of the principles he professes, he will nevertheless be obliged to behave in such
a way that his actions remain compatible with the claim that these principles genuinely moti-
vated him.35
Legitimating ideas may not explain why a person is acting in a particular way, but
they are among the things that constrain those actions. Legitimating ideas are «inter-sub-
jective» rather than the possession of the powerful and the representation of a political
action as legitimate involves an attempt to reconcile the action in hand with these wider
values. Failure to justify action in this way limits effectiveness. At the same time, having
laid claim to a particular justification for action other actions become necessary in order
to sustain the credibility of the justification. Even if the ideas are not the real motives for
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34. Glenn Burgess, The politics of the ancient constitution: an introduction to English political thought,
1603-1642 (Basingstoke, 1992), p. 168.
35. Quentin Skinner, «Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action», reprinted in James
Tully (ed.), Meaning and context Quentin Skinner and his critics (Princeton, 1988), 97-118, 309-11, quotation
at p. 116.
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action, they set limits to what can or cannot be done subsequently. Ideas are constraining
because there are limits to the sphere of action that can plausibly be justified with refe-
rence to particular values: «to recover the nature of the normative vocabulary available
to an agent for the description and appraisal of his conduct is at the same time to indi-
cate one of the constraints on his conduct itself.»36 What I want to suggest is the ambi-
guities about legitimate political power in early Stuart England, whether sincerely in-
tended or not, provided a resource for those who wanted to resist.
The trend in recent work has been to downplay the significance of ideological con-
flict in England in the two generations before the civil war. Burgess has demonstrated
how a number of political languages were the common currency of politics in early
Stuart politics, and has argued that this represented a «consensus». He has demonstra-
ted that a number of apparently conflicting views of kingship –based on divine right, ci-
vil law or the English common law– were not alternatives but ways of discussing parti-
cular dimensions of kingship. «Early Stuart Englishmen did possess a variety of
theoretical perspectives on monarchy, but they also possessed an intellectual framework
that united those perspectives into a broadly consensual “world view”».37 One example
discussed by Burgess is that of James Whitelock. In 1613 he was imprisoned for sugges-
ting that the King’s prerogative was subject to the law of the land, and in particular was
bound by Magna Carta. Burgess argues that both Whitelock and those prosecuting him
agreed that the relationship between the law and prerogative was ambiguous –that in
some degree the prerogative was subject to legal regulation. «No-one said», argues Bur-
gess, «that the prerogative could act contrary to the common law, only that it could in
some circumstances supply a deficiency in the law». Both sides, in court, avoided these
general issues and «Whitelock seems to have had the bad luck to say the wrong thing at
the wrong time, and in consequence to have fallen foul of a king and a council determi-
ned to use him to make a point».38
Viewed from this perspective disputes about taxation did not arise as a result of the-
oretical differences, but as a result of disagreement over which of these theoretical pers-
pectives on kingship was appropriate to the particular case. So, for example, in the early
seventeenth century James I raised a form of revenue called impositions, whose legality
was questioned in the courts. These were imposed on the import of particular goods into
England by virtue of the royal prerogative, not by parliamentary grant. The arguments
ranged over whether or not such a political act should be regulated by the royal prero-
gative or by the common law. If they were acknowledged to be taxes, then, everyone
agreed, they could not be raised without parliamentary consent. But if they were measu-
res of commercial regulation, everyone also agreed, then they were a matter for the royal
prerogative and parliament had no business interfering. Burgess’s argument then is that
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this represented a fundamental consensus about the relationship between the Royal Pre-
rogative and parliamentary sanction. The argument was a more limited one, about how
to categorise Impositions. If they were taxes then they could not be raised without par-
liamentary consent, if they were not, then parliament had no jurisdiction over them.
In a sense, you might say, this is a pretty serious conflict –a group of people were ar-
guing in court that their King was acting illegally and Whitelock was sent to prison for
saying the wrong thing at the wrong time. Of course, Burgess’s point is not to deny that
there was such conflict, but to downplay its theoretical significance. In his discussion of
a number of these constitutional issues, he concludes that they reflected primarily prac-
tical conflict, «which is of little interest for the history of political thought».39
For our purposes, however, we might also reverse the claim –that such consensus is
the necessary preliminary to a political argument. Quentin Skinner makes exactly this
case in fact. What creates ideological change is the use of existing political conventions
for a new purpose, or the attempt to achieve some practical end by manipulating these
conventions. In order to understand authors’ intentions in writing political texts we
must understand «how far, they were accepting and endorsing, or questioning and re-
pudiating, or perhaps even polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and con-
ventions of political debate». We must be alert to what an author is actually doing in ma-
nipulating these conventions –for example, in the case of Machiavelli, what he was trying
to do by blandly claiming that the essence of government was the preservation of the
prince. To contemporaries this premise would have been quite obviously polemical. Ide-
ological change arises from these political manouevres, as old conventions are re-defined
and new ones given new currency. For Skinner, what people say is important, because it
limits what they can subsequently do, but we cannot ignore their purposes in saying it. I
would suggest, therefore, that the key issue is not that there is agreement on a particular
theoretical proposition, but who is appealing to it, for what purpose and with what cre-
dibility?40
An illustration of my approach is offered by reactions to the benevolence raised in
1614. A benevolence was a gift given by the people to the King, for some extraordinary
purpose. Unlike a subsidy, a gift given through parliament, this was simply collected th-
rough local governors –there was no consent given. Failure to pay resulted in imprison-
ment. In all, the free gift was demanded on pain of imprisonment. Justices of the peace
in Devon refused to co-operate in 1614, but in contradicting express royal will they laid
claim to the language of dutiful subjection. They were concerned, they said at «The ex-
ceeding preiudice that may come to posterity by such a President.» Acknowledging the
King’s «great necessitty» and how much it had wrought «upon the affections of every
particular of us» they claimed that only «the feare of the iust blame of after ages» could
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have stood between them and paying the money «in it self so requisite… and advanced
by so many reverent examples.» Moreover,
In regard of the many blessings which we dayly receive by his most peacefull and gratious
goverment … wee humbly entreate your Honours to rest assured that none of his Majesty’s
Subiects whatsoever shalbe more ready and forward then our selves in all the antient lawfull
and laudable course of this kingdome, to lay downe our goods at his Majesty’s feete, for the
supply of his wants; Of which we are at this time so sensible as wee are very sorry that we are
deprived of the present meanes to shewe our faithfull zeale and loyall affections in that be-
half.41
Their counterparts in Somerset made a similar case, claiming they would gladly pay
subsidies and that «wee are so farr from any want of true and loyall affeccon to our Kin-
ge and Country as you shall ever finde us with most willing and cherefull hartes ready to
prostrate our goodes and lives at his Majesty’s Royall ffeete for the safety of his person
and defence of his Kingdomes.» They could not, of course, in good conscience agree to
the payment of the benevolence.42 Oliver St John, went further, declaring the benevo-
lence against law, reason and religion. To pay would be to assist the king to break his co-
ronation oath to uphold the laws of the land, and so contributors faced a «hellish dan-
ger» in paying «as verie irreligiously and uncharitably wee helpe forward the King’s
Majestie in that greivous sinne of periurie».43 Direct opposition to express Royal will was
here expressed in a consensual language. No such avenue of resistance was available af-
ter 1660.
Whatever the actual motivation of these people, political conventions constrained
their action. In seeking to achieve a practical end –to avoid submitting to this particular
demand for money– they appealed to conventional, and agreed, political languages. For
Burgess this suggests a consensus at the basis of political life. For me, it suggests that
existing conventions of political life did not allow effective political action –they needed
to be changed. What we see in these arguments is, I think, a process by which conven-
tions were being tested and manipulated, by groups with quite different aims in mind. A
consequence of the ambiguity of the existing conventions was that money could not be
raised in the quantities thought necessary by the king and his leading councillors. My
larger point is that political culture –that is the institutions, languages and conventions
in terms of which political argument is carried out– is therefore a crucial part of the ex-
planation for greater tax yields even if we presume that no-one was acting altruistically
in terms of the values of that political culture.44
This is perhaps an unrealistic assumption –although it is one which many historians
seem to adopt in addressing the question of taxation. To soften it, by suggesting for
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example that fears about political liberties were sincerely held by some people, is to
strengthen the case being made here –that political ideas are crucial to an understanding
of the development of the fiscal-military state. The record of non-parliamentary taxation
before 1640 suggests that parliamentary sanction was important in the minimal sense,
and reinforces the sense that the really important thing about the post-1640 regimes is
that virtually all their money came from parliament. On a micro-historical level, to re-
turn to our notional reluctant taxpayer, the issue seems to be that parliamentary sanction
was, intersubjectively, unchallengeable. There was no legitimate way to represent resis-
tance to political action warranted by parliament.
IV
We might say that there is a further issue of political culture here –who has the right ac-
tually to collect taxes? Here, I think, it is helpful to think about the moment at which
money changes hands –legitimation operated not just at a systematic level, but in the
face-to-face contexts were political action actually happens. Officeholders were not
simply constrained by the formal limits of their office, but by the wider social expecta-
tions that surrounded their exercise of office. In presenting themselves, in particular si-
tuations, as officeholders these men had to perform relatively standardised social roles
which both asserted and legitimated their authority. In effect, they presented a «self»,
defined in terms of the formal powers of their office but also the wider expectations held
about the conduct of officeholders. Presentation of this self was part of the process of
government –and failure to project or defend this face successfully could lead to politi-
cal or administrative difficulty.45 Early modern officeholders were sensitive to such cha-
llenges to their public face and were easily put off their stroke by «violent words». For
example, John Harman’s public contempt for subsidy collectors in London in the early
seventeenth century apparently limited their effectiveness. Harman «with great scorn
and contemptuously refused to pay demanding in a proud and scornful manner who
were the assessors». Told that they were common councilmen he «openly replied and
said in contempt and discountenance of your highness’s service and in disgrace of his
Majesty’s officers therein employed that they were all blockheads and fools saying furt-
her had the beetle headed asses nothing else to busy their beetle heads withall but to as-
sess him».46 The effect of these words was to undermine the performance of the officer,
by robbing him of the dignity necessary to his office, and undercutting his presentation
of himself in terms of the values of what was taken to be natural authority.
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Many offices in early modern England were justified with reference to patriarchal
ideals –kings and magistrates acted as fathers to their people, protecting and correc-
ting them. But appeal to these values created expectations which officeholders had to
fulfill in order to appear credible. For example, the political influence of the earl of
Shrewsbury was threatened, in the mid-sixteenth century, by the strained relations he
had with his tenants in Glossopdale and Ashford and with his wife. These failings as
head of his household and father of his country were, it seems, used by his opponents
to undermine his position at court. A lengthy and complicated feud with Sir John
Zouch was played out in conflicts over the patronage of offices in local government.
It became a court issue because Zouch, and the tenants of Glossopdale, took their
grievances there. Shrewsbury corresponded anxiously with both Leicester and
Burghley and a lengthy report from his son at court betrayed extreme sensitivity to
perceptions of his father there and the extent of his father’s popularity or unpopula-
rity. It seems that there was indeed some threat to his position for Burghley himself
was dispatched for a visit. In the course of all this Leicester said to Shrewsbury’s son
that what was most likely to persuade the Queen of his unfitness for office was not the
dispute with the tenantry, but reports «that there were not good agreement betwixt my
lord & my ladie and that it was informed the Queen & others that were was a secret di-
vision betwixt your doeings».47 This threatened loss of political authority was to be
justified in terms of his supposed shortcomings as head of his household and perhaps
as landlord. He was failing to conform to a broadly defined social role, associated with
his office.48
This role-playing was quite self-conscious: gentlemen and aristocrats advised their
sons about a fully rounded social role, explaining the behaviour expected of them in re-
lation to their family, neighbours, superiors and inferiors. Conduct at table and in the
field was recommended and, within this broad advice about the presentation of the self
in public situations, how to conduct oneself if called to office. The fifth earl of Hun-
tingdon’s advice to his son listed all these things as «public» concernments, including
the choice of wife and conduct towards her. Among all these roles the public presenta-
tion of self was clearly of pre-eminent significance: «There is nothing will more increase
or lessen thy esteeme then thy carriage abroade for men that cannot judge of thee nor
p[er]chance thou shalt ever see againe will censure of thee by thy outward behaviour».
On the other hand, «This applause is not very hard for putting of thy hatt, takeinge of
them by the hande, callinge them by their names, in thy answers a kinde and courteous
speech winne mens affections exceedingly». Office was clearly part of a wider social role
for eminent and ambitious gentlemen. The expectations implicit in these wider social ro-
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les might constrain them since they offered the means by which individual’s performan-
ce could be appraised and criticised.49
Particular roles were effective in particular ways, and less effective in others.50
County officeholders were ineffective revenue agents in early Stuart England. Acting as
the father of their country they underestimated the wealth of their friends and neigh-
bours, and sought to ensure that their neighbourhood was taxed no more heavily than
others locally. In doing so they were acting in accordance with their duty to protect tho-
se for whom they were responsible –weighing up a variety of factors in reaching a tax as-
sessment. For example, those with children, or who were known to be good to the poor,
seem to have been better treated than those who lent money, or who did not provide
good hospitality to their neighbours.51 This kind of behaviour was consonant with the
image of a father of the country, but was not the best way of maximising revenue.
The ineffectiveness of these officeholders as tax officials helps to explain the pres-
sures behind the creation of entirely new social roles such as, for example, that of the ex-
ciseman. There had been specialised revenue agents during the earlier part of the cen-
tury –purveyors, for example– but their effectiveness had been restricted by the hostility
that they provoked. Such offices lacked a generalised legitimacy –their holders were ac-
tive only as revenue agents and they were presumed to have a direct personal interest in
increasing yields. They were, thus, suspected of corruption and they were referred to in
terms of biblical plagues– locusts, caterpillars, frogs and so forth. This was equally true
of excise officers in the early 1640s. By the 1680s, however, the nature of the office was
being transformed. Unsuitable local officers were being weeded out and salaries were in-
creased in the expectation that improved administration would increase the yield and
more than cover the increased costs. Promotion by merit and training, combined with
adequate salaries, further stimulated efficiency. Officers were expected to be full-time,
to be employed away from their place of birth and to be moved frequently. After 1687
they were also encouraged by comprehensive accident insurance and superannuation.52
The result was a precocious bureaucracy and one which achieved notable increases in
yield. In 1690 there were 1,211 full-time employees in the excise department.53
Later seventeenth-century England saw a new faith in the application of quantitati-
ve precision to problems of government, but this professionalism in the excise service
also represented a response to an immediate problem of legitimation. It served to coun-
ter the accusations of corruption and arbitrary power that had bedeviled specialized re-
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venue agents in the past such as monopolists, tax farmers and excisemen. By the mid-
1680s an elaborate system of administrative oversight had been established which, ac-
cording to Charles Davenant, prevented lower officers running into «sloth» and «the su-
perior into corruption», and the accurate measure of production offered the possibility
of maximizing revenue without endangering the legitimacy of the administration. This
was associated with a new self-presentation adopted by excise officers, outlined in print
in by Ezekial Polstead on the basis of his experiences as an exciseman in South Wales in
1697. Polstead described «an identity shaped by being a professional state official»,
applying impersonal, mathematical rules indifferently.54
The functional ineffectiveness of county officeholders in raising taxation had been a
product partly of how they had understood themselves and how others had understood
their roles. Part of the process of administrative reform had been to establish new rules
of procedure in taxation which meant that they could not countenance evasion at the ex-
pense of total yield. But a part of it too, had been the development of a new social role
–one which many historians are tempted to refer to as bureaucratic.
Here, then, we have an account of changes in the form of the state –what, in the lan-
guage of macro-sociology is referred to as bureaucratisation is here given a specific me-
aning, and its emergence more fully explained by the process of legitimation or by the
problem of securing compliance. This is, I take it, Bourdieu’s larger point about the mo-
dern French bureaucracy. Looking with an anthropologists eye at the operations of the
French bureaucracy, Bourdieu is struck by the performance of state magic –the recons-
titution of social reality by administrators. «Operations of regularisation, such as recog-
nising a child, or, quite simply, recording its birth … are so many bureaucratic ma-
nouevres that, in a way, change nothing, and, in another sense, change everything,
specifically, the collectively attributed meaning and publicly recognised social value of
the act or thing in question, with very real consequences: the right to an inheritance, to
dependents’ allowances, to disability pensions, to sick leave, etc.». The power to do this
is conveyed through a series of social signifiers, indicating that the person in question is
qualified to perform state magic –they have the appropriate formal qualifications and
present themselves in the ways that elite schools have groomed them.55 In doing so, the
literally «perform» their office. In drawing attention to the element of performance in
bureaucracy, a connection is made with older forms of political performance –a cultural
history of the forms of representation of political authority become possible. Bureau-
cratic legitimation is not, in that sense, entirely different from other forms of legitima-
tion, all of which depersonalised the action in hand.
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VThere is then, a complementarity between, on one hand, the micro-sociological pers-
pective on compliance, legitimation and the performance of bureaucracy and, on the ot-
her, the macro approach of historical sociologists such as Thomas Ertman. Ertman is
concerned with differences in the forms of European states, and he distinguishes these
differences along two axes –the location of sovereignty (whether sovereign power lies in
a parliament or with the monarch, for example); and the nature of the administration
(patrimonial authority or bureaucracy, for example). He derives these differences from
the impact of military mobilisation, and the impact that the need for this mobilisation
had on political settlements between influential interests –especially between monarchs,
nobilities and cities, for example.56 His account seems to imply that such settlements are
consciously reached –that patterns of sovereignty and local administration are actually
designed– someone, somewhere, invented bureaucracy for conscious political purposes.
I have not really had anything to say about the first of Ertman’s axes –the relationship
between crown and parliament– but my account of the development of patterns of ad-
ministration does differ from his in that it does not depend on conscious design. Inste-
ad it is the outcome of numerous local negotiations of compliance, and of answering par-
ticular objections. In short, bureaucratic forms of legitimation closed off respectable
arguments for resistance. This is not a contrary, but a complementary perspective, ad-
ding to the insights of macro-sociology a micro-sociological concern with how power ac-
tually works on the ground.
The connection lies in the concept of the social role. These roles have to be unders-
tood in terms of broader values –political culture– and studied using the techniques of
cultural history.57 Firstly, in order to demonstrate the importance of parliamentary sanc-
tion it is not necessary to show that people genuinely believed that parliamentary autho-
rity was sacrosanct. It is necessary only to show that there was no respectable way of sa-
ying anything else, and that therefore an avenue of resistance was closed off. Secondly,
changes in the overall form and functioning of the state were represented locally in terms
of social roles adopted by officeholders, and the social roles which these officers were
forced to adopt in order to secure consent in turn led to the transformation of forms of
state power.
Political conflicts, and war in particular, are transformative for forms of legitimation
because of the scale of the personal and social demands that they make. As Tully puts it,
in expounding Skinner’s views, «it is practical conflict and war that lie at the foundations
of modern political thought».58 This was true in both cases: of the overarching legitima-
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tions of political activity, and in the creation of social roles which gave a real meaning to
those abstract claims. The material and administrative consequences were significant,
and seeking to justify those material consequences might have had the effect of driving
political debate deeper –a number of local studies have revealed that the languages of
national political debate were reproduced in much more humble surroundings as villa-
gers faced the consequences of military mobilisation during the civil wars.59 In some ca-
ses this entailed the creation of new social roles, defined in terms of new values. Some of
these new social roles in the localities resembled bureaucratic forms of authority. Thus,
although the macro-sociologies have been extremely revealing of large-scale change, mi-
cro-sociologies, of the everyday contexts in which states were formed and resources
were mobilised, are an essential complement to an understanding of how this was achie-
ved, explained or justified and with what practical consequences.
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